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Abstract 
 
Based on a laboratory experiment conducted with 131 adult non-students subjects, we 
empirically examine the salience of an excise and sales tax on changing consumers’ eating 
behavior. We compare the caloric and nutrient content of the meals selected by the subjects using 
a difference-in-difference regression model to determine the efficacy of the policy treatments. 
The results indicate that an inclusive tax (i.e., an excise tax) has a significantly stronger effect on 
reducing some undesirable nutritional factors such as calories, calories from fat, carbohydrates, 
cholesterol, added sugar and sodium compared with an exclusive tax (i.e., a sales tax). 
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The Salience of Excise vs. Sales Taxes on Healthy Eating: An Experimental Study 
I. Introduction 
	 	 	 	 Obesity among U.S. adults has reached epidemic proportions. As reported in 2013, the adult 
obesity rate in the United States is 34.9% (National Center for Health Statistics [NCHS], 2013). 
The prevalence of obesity among middle-aged adults was 39.5% in the United States in 
2011-2012 (Ogden et al. 2013). According to the World Health Organization [WHO], obesity is a 
major risk factor for a number of chronic diseases, including heart disease, stroke, type II 
diabetes and certain types of cancer. One study estimates that the current direct and indirect costs 
of obesity are more than $190 billion annually in the United States (Institute of Medicine [IOM], 
2013). The WHO (2013) states that the fundamental cause of people being overweight or obese 
is an energy imbalance between calories consumed and expended, and an increased intake of 
foods that are high in fat is undoubtedly one of the major contributions. 
In order to reduce obesity, economic incentives/disincentives have been implemented to 
promote healthy diets. Chief among these policies is a tax on unhealthy foods. The Rudd Center 
for Food Policy and Obesity at Yale (2013) suggest two methods for raising prices of unhealthy 
foods: 1) tax foods with poor nutrients profiles; and 2) tax broader categories of unhealthy food 
and beverages, such as carbonated drinks and snacks. Most of the states and cities in the United 
States implementing tax policies to fight obesity have adopted the first method and levied taxes 
on the soft drink category. For example, San Francisco supervisors have introduced a 
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2-cents-per-ounce tax on sugary drinks sold in the city. More recently, the second method of 
levying unhealthy food tax (also known as a “fat tax”) is also being discussed, proposed, and 
even implemented in several countries. In 2011, Denmark imposed the world’s first fat tax on 
foods with more than 2.3% saturated fats; but the policy was abolished in 2012. These food taxes 
are collected in the form of a higher sales tax rate compared to the regular food tax rate, or an 
additional excise tax. Among the thirty-three states in the United States that levy taxes on soft 
drinks, twenty-five of them apply only the sales tax to the category, one applies only an excise 
tax, and seven apply both excise and sales taxes (Zheng, McLaughlin, and Kaiser, 2013). 
The difference between a sales and an excise tax is key to understanding how they induce 
different consumer behaviors. The fundamental difference is whether the tax is levied at the point 
of production or the point of sale. Sales taxes are typically expressed in tax-exclusive terms (Tax 
Policy Center, 2008), because a sales tax is not reflected by the posted-price, but rather is added 
at the register upon checkout. Conversely, the amount of an excise tax is included in the posted 
price, so an excise tax typically has higher “salience” than a sales tax.  The economic literature 
has investigated and compared the efficacy of these two types of taxes. Miao, Beghin and Jensen 
(2010) suggest that both a sales tax on sweetened goods and a sweetener input tax can reduce 
added sweetener consumption, but the latter policy causes about five times less consumer surplus 
loss than the former. Chetty, Looney and Kroft (2009) find that consumers tend to under-react to 
taxes that are not included in posted prices because of the difficulty in computing the gross 
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after-tax price. Relatedly, Zheng, McLaughlin and Kaiser (2013, henceforth ZMK) focus on the 
effect of imperfect tax knowledge, and conclude that a sales tax change does not reduce demand 
as much as an excise tax change of the same magnitude. While these and other studies are useful 
in understanding tax salience, there is an absence of empirical research on the impact of applying 
the taxes on food and beverage demand.  
Accordingly, the goal of this research is to empirically study the effect of an excise vs. sales 
tax on consumer tax salience on the demand for food and beverages. As defined by Chetty, 
Looney and Kroft (2009), the “salience” of a tax indicates the simplicity of calculating the 
gross-of-tax price of a good. To achieve our goal, we designed a controlled laboratory 
experiment conducted with 131 adult, non-student subjects that were asked to select lunch items 
from a cafeteria menu. Each subjects was randomly assigned to a control group or one of the two 
treatments: (1) 20% excise tax on unhealthy foods and beverages and (2) 20% sales tax on 
unhealthy foods and beverages.  We examine taxes that are levied on unhealthy foods. A 
difference-in-difference regression model is used to determine the efficacy of the various policy 
treatments in terms of reducing calories, fat, added sugar, cholesterol, and sodium intake. The 
result confirm our hypothesis that while both taxes reduce caloric and other nutrient intake, an 
inclusive tax (i.e., the excise tax) has a more significant impact on consumers’ eating behavior, 
caloric intake and nutrient intake than an exclusive tax (i.e., a sales tax).  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the related 
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literature. Section 3 presents the theoretical framework developed from ZMK. Section 4 presents 
the experimental design. Section 5 presents the data and the difference-in-difference model, and 
discusses the estimation results. Section 6 concludes. 
II. An Overview on the Debate over Fat Taxes 
   The idea of levying an “overweight fee” dates back to 1940s (Engber, 2009), but was not 
well known until the 1980s when Brownell (1980) proposed that revenue from junk-food taxes 
be used to subsidize more healthful foods and fund nutrition campaigns. In 1994, Brownell 
argued that healthy foods cost more than unhealthy foods in a New York Times, Op-Ed piece and 
proposed the concept of a “fat tax”. Since then, the idea of adopting food tax policies to combat 
obesity has been discussed worldwide. Kim and Kawachi (2006) and Powell et al. (2009) find 
that changes in the relative prices of healthy and unhealthy foods impact consumption patterns 
and lower obesity levels. Brownell and Frieden (2009) argue that taxes on fattening foods have 
three justifications: (1) the contribution of unhealthful diets to the illnesses cited previously 
creates an externality to health care costs; (2) food nutritional information is asymmetric between 
consumers and food firms; and (3) the revenue generated from such taxes can increase societal 
benefits by promoting healthy diets. The authors believe that a tax on sweetened beverages 
would encourage consumers to switch to more healthful beverages and hence reduce caloric 
intake. Along the similar lines, Chaloupka et al. (2011a) argue that a sizeable tax on 
sugar-sweetened beverages would not only lead to significant reduction in calorie intake, but 
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would also generate significant new revenues that can be used to support obesity prevention 
effort. Chaloupka et al. (2011b) furthermore argue that the revenue generated by such a tax 
would further enhance the effectiveness of a large tax on sweetened beverages.  
However, these results are not universally accepted in the literature, notably among 
economists that believe existing evidence on the effectiveness of fat taxes is mixed. Cash et al. 
(2007) suggest that the economic evidence on food price interventions to improve healthy diets is 
far from complete; therefore the impact of such policies is unclear. Chouinard et al. (2007) argue 
that fat taxes are extremely regressive, and would cause greater welfare losses on the elderly and 
poor. Similarly, Engber (2009) contends that a fat tax would fall disproportionately on poorer 
people who tend to consume more fattening food and who are more sensitive to price. Gandel 
(2011) casts doubt on the efficacy of taxing unhealthy food, suggesting that taxes have little 
impact on altering consumer behavior. Fletcher et al (2011a) argue that policymakers can 
improve sugar-sweetened beverage tax by expanding its scope and motivation. They suggest that 
expanding the scope of a tax to include all calorie-dense foods besides sugar-sweetened 
beverages would enhance the effectiveness of such policy, and motivating it as a way to improve 
population health instead of just reducing obesity would lead to a more desirable outcome. 
Fletcher et al (2011b) believe that to achieve a broader goal of improving population health 
requires a more comprehensive policy that includes not only the sugar sweetened beverage tax, 
but also other restrictions. An empirical study by Lusk and Schroeter (2013) suggests that a soda 
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tax is very unlikely to be welfare enhancing, unless it is justified on the grounds that abandon 
standard rationality assumptions.  
    Among the supporters of fat tax policies, the question of which stage, production or sale, 
should the tax be levied at has attracted much attention. Engelhard et al. (2009) argue that 
although an “upstream” tax can avoid administrative complications for stores, a sales tax has 
countervailing advantages, including generating revenue that rises with inflation, and allowing 
for a short-term tax exemption. Brownell and Frieden (2009), however, point out that by levying 
tax as a percentage of the retail price, sales tax policies would actually encourage the purchase of 
larger containers at a lower unit price; while an excise tax structured as a fixed cost per ounce 
would be more effective in reducing consumption. The authors also indicate that as 
manufacturers pass the excise tax along to customers, the amount of the tax would be included in 
the price consumers see when making selection, and therefore cause a greater drop in 
consumption than a sales tax.  
   In order to examine how an exclusive tax such as a sales tax would lead to sub-optimizing 
shopping behavior, Chetty, Looney and Kroft (2009) conduct an experiment and an observational 
study, according to which they conclude that salience is an important determinant of the effect of 
a tax. To explain their empirical findings, they introduce small cognitive costs into the 
neoclassical model of consumer choice and show that small cognitive costs can significantly 
affect the welfare consequences of tax policies. Likewise, Feldman and Ruffle (2012) test the 
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equivalence of tax-inclusive and tax-exclusive prices, and show based on data generated from a 
lab experiment that people buy more under a tax-exclusive regime than under an equivalent 
tax-inclusive regime. But as in each round of their experiment, they either include the tax in the 
prices of all items, or exclude it from the prices of all items, their results does not reveal the 
effect of consumers’ knowledge about the tax status. ZMK examines such effect. They focus on 
food and beverage demand, and develop a theoretical framework to examine the effect of a 
change in sales or excise taxes. They assume that while consumers have good knowledge of the 
tax rate, they are sometimes inattentive to sales tax, and may have misperception of the tax status 
of some items. They find that although both the effects of a sales tax and an excise tax are 
influenced by imperfect tax knowledge, the effect that an excise tax change has on demand is 
largely comparable with that of a price change, while a sales tax fails to affect demand as much 
as an excise tax of the same magnitude. 
   While these studies provide a solid theoretical foundation and empirical evidence on the 
effect of tax salience on consumer demand, the research summarized here contributes to the 
scarce empirical literature on the impact of tax salience on healthy eating behavior. The principle 
purpose of this research is to conduct a luncheon experiment to provide empirical evidence for 
the conclusions drawn from the theoretical model of ZMK. Compared to the existing empirical 
studies, this research uses a controlled laboratory experiment where subjects are given adequate 
time to make a more careful purchasing decision than they do in a field study, thus it better 
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reveals the actual effect of tax salience on consumer’s selection. This is the first paper, to our 
knowledge, to examine the impact of tax salience concentrating on healthy and unhealthy food 
consumption using data generated from a controlled laboratory experiment. The theoretical 
model and the structure of the experiment are described below. 
III. Theoretical Framework 
The ZMK model is based on the assumption that although consumers have good knowledge 
of the sales tax rate, they may have misperceptions concerning the tax status (whether the 
product is taxable or exempt) of each item. In the model presented below, it is assumed that there 
are four types of consumers1:  
A. Consumers who know the tax status on food and beverage items before and after the tax 
change; 
B. Consumers who know the tax status before the tax change but misperceive it after the tax 
change; 
C. Consumers who misperceive the tax status before the tax change but correct it after the 
tax change; 
D. Consumers who misperceive the tax status before and after the tax change. 
																																																								
1	 ZMK	divides	consumers	into	four	groups	by	taking	into	consider	whether	consumers	have	correct	information	of	the	
change	of	tax	rate.	As	both	the	excise	and	sales	tax	rates	are	clearly	stated	in	all	the	treatment	groups	of	our	experiment,	
we	classify	consumers	only	according	to	their	knowledge	of	the	tax	status.	To	simplify	our	model,	we	do	not	take	SNAP	
users	into	account.	
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To evaluate the impact of tax on the demand for food and beverages, ZMK follow Chetty et 
al. (2009) and develop a log-linearized demand function. Adopting the notation in ZMK, let 
ݔ	ሺ݌, ݎሻ denote total demand for food and beverages that is subject to an unhealthy food tax, 
and	݌ denote the shelf price and ݎ the tax rate. Accordingly, the demand function before the tax 
change is: 
(1) ݈݊	ݔ௖ሺ݌, ݎሻ 	ൌ ݈݊	ሺߙ݌ఉሾ1 ൅ ௕ܸሺݎሻఏఉሿሽ 
where ܸ	ሺݎሻ indicates consumers’ perceived tax rate before the change in policy, ߠ measures 
the degree of consumers’ underreacting to a tax, and ߚ is the price elasticity of the demand. The 
subscript ܿ indicates the four consumer types, ܿ	 ൌ 1, 1; 	1, 0; 0, 1; 0, 0 for type A, B, C, D 
respectively. The subscript ܾ ൌ 1 if consumers belong to type A and type B, and ܾ ൌ 0 
otherwise. 
Similarly, the demand function after the tax change ݔ′	ሺ݌, ݎ′ሻ is: 
(2) ݈݊	ݔᇱ௖ሺ݌, ݎ′ሻ 	ൌ ݈݊	ሺߙ݌ఉሾ1 ൅ ܸᇱ௖ሺݎ′ሻா	ሺఏሻ	ఉሿሽ 
where ݎ′ the new tax rate after the change of the policy. ܧሺߠሻ 	ൌ 	1 if an excise tax is imposed, 
and ܧሺߠሻ 	ൌ 	ߠ if a sales tax is imposed.  
Since the total demand ݔ ൌ ݔଵ,ଵ ൅ ݔଵ,଴൅	ݔ଴,ଵ ൅ ݔ଴,଴, now the rate of change in the total 
demand can be derived as: 
	 11
(3) 
݀	݈݊	ݔ ൌ ߚ	ሼܭଵܭ′ଵ	݈݊	 ሾଵା௏భ,భ
ᇲ ሺ௥ᇱሻሿಶሺഇሻ
ሾଵା௏భሺ௥ሻሿഇ ൅	ܭଵܭ′଴	݈݊	
ሾଵା௏భ,బᇲ ሺ௥ᇱሻሿಶሺഇሻ
ሾଵା௏భሺ௥ሻሿഇ ൅ܭ଴ܭ′ଵ	݈݊	
ሾଵା௏బ,భᇲ ሺ௥ᇱሻሿಶሺഇሻ
ሾଵା௏బሺ௥ሻሿഇ ൅
ܭ଴	ܭ′଴	݈݊	 ሾଵା௏బ,బ
ᇲ ሺ௥ᇱሻሿಶሺഇሻ
ሾଵା௏బሺ௥ሻሿഇ ሽ 
where ܭ and ܭ′ are the knowledge parameters introduced by ZMK, indicating the knowledge 
levels of consumers about the tax status before and after the tax change, respectively. 
Before the tax policy is implemented, there is no tax on all food items. Therefore ଵܸሺݎሻ ൌ 0 
for type A and B consumers. But for the other consumers, who may misperceive the tax status 
and believe that there is a tax with rate	ݎ, ଴ܸሺݎሻ 	ൌ ݎ.  
    First, suppose that the government decides to levy an excise tax on unhealthy food and 
beverages. Since an excise tax is a price inclusive tax, there will be no under-reactions, and 
therefore 	ܧ	ሺߠሻ ൌ 1  as defined. And ଵܸ,ଵᇱ ሺݎ′ሻ ൌ ଵܸ,଴ᇱ ሺݎ′ሻ ൌ ଴ܸ,ଵᇱ ሺݎ′ሻ ൌ ݎᇱ , but 
ሾ1 ൅ ଴ܸ,଴ᇱ ሺݎ′ሻሿ஽	ሺఏሻ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ݎ′ሻ஽	ሺఏሻሺ1 ൅ ݎሻఏ  because for type D consumers, there is a 
misperceived sales tax in addition to the actual excise tax. Hence, the percentage change in the 
demand can be calculated by: 
(4)	݀	݈݊	ݔ௘ ൌ ߚ	ሼ݈݊	ሺ1 ൅ ݎ′ሻ	െ	ߠܭ଴	ܭ‘ଵ݈݊	ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻሽ 
   Now consider the case where the government levies a sales tax on unhealthy food and 
beverages. In this case,	 ଵܸ,ଵᇱ ሺݎ′ሻ ൌ ଴ܸ,ଵᇱ ሺݎ′ሻ ൌ ݎᇱ, but ଵܸ,଴ᇱ ሺݎ′ሻ ൌ ଴ܸ,଴ᇱ ሺݎ′ሻ ൌ 0 because consumers 
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of type B and D misperceive the tax status after the tax change. ܧ	ሺߠሻ ൌ 	ߠ as defined. Hence, 
the percentage change in the demand is: 
(5)	݀	݈݊	ݔ௦ ൌ ߚ	ߠ	ሼܭ′ଵ	݈݊	ሺ1 ൅ ݎᇱሻ	െ	ܭ଴	݈݊	ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻሽ 
To evaluate the difference between the impacts of an excise tax and that of a sales tax, we 
compare equation (4) and (5) in equation (6): 
(6) ݀	݈݊	ݔ௘ െ ݀	݈݊	ݔ௦ 
        =	ߚሺ1 െ ߠܭ′ଵሻሾ݈݊	ሺ1 ൅ ݎᇱሻ ൅ ܭ଴	݈݊	ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻሿ 
which is greater than 0 since ߠ ൏ 1 and ܭ′ଵ ൏ 1. Hence, the result leads to the conclusion that 
a sales tax change does not reduce the demand as much as an excise tax change. This is the main 
hypothesis that we test with our experiment data and empirical model.  
IV. Experimental Design 
A total of 131 adult non-student subjects participated in the economic experiment. Subjects 
were paid $20 cash, plus a $10 voucher that could be spent exclusively on food items that they 
selected from the lunch menu used in the experiment2. The lunch menu contained food items in 
three main categories: entrées, beverages, and desserts. Each category consisted of relatively 
																																																								
2	 The	list	of	food	items	and	prices	were	from	the	menu	of	the	“Trillium”	dining	hall	where	subjects	could	redeem	the	
voucher	and	get	their	selected	meals	after	the	experiment.	
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healthy (e.g., veggie cup) and unhealthy (e.g., cheese burger) items. 
Each subject viewed two menus. The first menu presented the base prices that were the 
same across the control and two treatment groups. The prices on the second menu varied by 
treatment (see the full list of food items and prices on each menu in Appendix, A1).  
There were two parts in the experiment. In each part, subjects were asked to select food and 
beverage items from a lunch menu presented to them in the course of the experiment. They were 
asked to use the $10 endowment of vouchers to pay for their lunch selections. The participants 
were told that they would complete a series of menus and that one of the completed menus was 
randomly drawn before the start of the experiment, and that the choice of lunch food items on 
this particular menu would be binding for them. If they spent less than $10 on the drawn menu, 
they could not receive the excess in cash, and if they spent over $10, they could use part of their 
$20 cash payment in addition to the $10 endowment to pay for the selected items on the drawn 
menu. 
In Part 1, all subjects were asked to select lunch items from menu A. Prices on menu A were 
the same across all groups including the control and the two treatments.  
In Part 2, the control group was presented with the exact same menu as menu A, while the 
two treatments were provided with different menus: 
Treatment I. Inclusive tax treatment. Subjects in this group were provided menu B in this part, 
	 14
where the prices of unhealthy items were increased by a 20% excise tax, while prices of 
other items remained the same as on menu A. We included a note at the top of subjects’ 
computer screens that read: “A 20% ‘unhealthy food’ excise tax has been added to the price 
of unhealthy food and beverages.” 
Treatment II. Exclusive tax treatment. Subjects in this group were provided menu C in this 
part, where prices of all items were the same as on menu A, but with the following note on 
top of the screen: “A 20% ‘unhealthy food’ sales tax will be added to your purchase when 
you check out. ”  
For subjects in the control group and in the two treatment groups, the menus were presented 
on the computer screen. For the control group and treatment I, the total price was presented to 
them at the bottom of the screen. For treatment II, the subtotal price before sales tax was 
presented to them at the bottom of the screen, but the after-tax price was not presented to them 
until they checked out, and they could not return to change their orders.  
At the beginning of each part, participants were presented with written and oral instructions 
on how the computerized menus work. Subjects in the two tax treatments were also presented 
information about the taxes. During each part, participants were given ample time to complete 
their menus. After all parts were completed, participants were asked to complete a computerized 
questionnaire collecting their demographic information. The complete list of all the questions 
asked in the computerized survey is presented in appendix A2 
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V. Data and Estimation 
Model 
The econometric model we use to examine the impacts of the treatments on caloric intake 
and nutrient intake is a difference-in-difference (DID) model. As we have data on the same 
individuals in both pre- and post- periods, the original form of the DID model is applicable: 
(7)    ∆ ௜ܻ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ∑ ߚ௝ܦ௝ ൅ ߙଵ ௜ܺ ൅ ߝ௜ଶ௝ୀଵ  
where ∆ ௜ܻ is the difference in content of nutrient ܻ from menu 1 to menu 2 for individual ݅. 
We calculate ∆ ௜ܻ by summing the nutrient ܻ of items selected by individual ݅ on each menu, 
then subtracting the total value of it on menu 1 from that on menu 2. The term ܦ௝ is a series of 
treatment dummy variables, and ௜ܺ is a vector of control variables indicating the socioeconomic 
and demographic characteristics of individual ݅. 
In this study we choose the following nutritional factors to focus on, according to the Report 
of Dietary Reference Intakes (2010) and Dietary Guidelines Advisory Committee Report 
(Agricultural Research Service (ARS), 2010): calories, empty calories, calorie from fat, 
carbohydrate, fiber, fat, cholesterol, protein, added sugar and sodium. Most of the nutritional 
information was obtained from the National Agricultural Library of USDA 
(www.ndb.nal.usda.gov), and the Center for Nutrition Policy and Promotion (CNPP, 
https://www.supertracker.usda.gov/default.aspx), an organization of USDA. Some nutritional 
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information on beverages was obtained from either the manufacturer’s official website 
(http://www.pepsicobeveragefacts.com/) or the nutritional label on the package. 
We employ seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) estimation, due to the statistical 
inefficiency of multiple equation ordinary least squares (OLS) in estimating the treatment effects 
on correlated content of nutrients for each individual.  
Results 
Table 1 presents the means and standard deviations of the socio-economic and demographic 
characteristics, as well as the total caloric consumption of meals selected by participants across 
all treatment groups. Some of the socio-economic and demographic variables statistically 
significantly affected the intake of some of the nutritional factors. For example, participants with 
an income level of more than $160,000 consumed fewer calories. It is also shown in Table 1 that 
while participants in the control group selected more items on menu 2 than on menu 1, 
participants in the two treatments selected fewer. The mean change in calorie content for 
participants was negative across all groups, and the inclusive tax treatment had the biggest 
reduction in calorie consumption. 
The detailed numerical summary of the change in food selection is presented in Table 2. It is 
interesting to note that subjects in the inclusive tax and exclusive tax treatments actually made 
less change to their eating patterns than subjects in the control group. But in the two treatments, a 
	 17
bigger proportion of subjects who changed their eating pattern became less unhealthy compared 
to the control group. This was particularly evident in the entrée category, where among subjects 
who changed their eating patterns, 92% became less unhealthy in the inclusive tax treatment, and 
80% in the exclusive tax treatment. Meanwhile, if we look into the percentage of being less 
healthy, the numbers are very similar across treatments in the snack category. That is, although 
41% of all subjects changed their eating patterns in the snack category, which was more than any 
other food categories, these changes were not primarily due to the treatments.  
Table 3 presents the results from the SUR estimation comparing each treatment with the 
control group based on the entire menu. While both inclusive tax and exclusive tax had a 
negative impact on caloric consumption, only the inclusive tax was statistically significant. 
Subjects in this treatment consumed 156 fewer calories, which represented a 27.7% decrease 
compared to the control group3.  
As defined by the USDA, empty calories are “calories from food components such as added 
sugars and solid fats that provide little nutritional value”. Empty calorie gives us a better 
understanding of people’s intake of actual nutritional value. However, although the inclusive tax 
had a negative effect on empty calorie content while the exclusive tax did not, neither of these 
effects was significant. One similar nutrient is calories from fat; here only the inclusive tax 
treatment had a significant negative impact resulting in a 35.5% reduction.  
																																																								
3	 Unless	otherwise	specified,	all	estimated	percentage	changes	cited	in	this	paper	are	based	on	the	comparison	to	second	
menu	selection	of	the	control	group,	or	selections	in	corresponding	food	category	of	the	second	menu	of	the	control	group.	 	
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Some other nutritional factors such as carbohydrate, fat, cholesterol, added sugar and 
sodium are also considered undesirable nutrients, because they are generally over-consumed and 
thus are contributing to obesity and other health problems among the U.S population. Most of 
these nutritional factors changed significantly in the inclusive tax treatment except for fat. For 
example, compared to the content of the second menu selection in the control group, subjects in 
the inclusive tax treatment consumed 13 less grams (49.2%) of added sugar and 25 less 
milligrams (42.4%) of cholesterol, a major determinant of cardiovascular disease and type II 
diabetes (ARS, 2010). On the other hand, the exclusive tax had no significant impact on the 
content of these undesirable nutrients except for carbohydrates. 
Nutrients such as fiber and protein are considered beneficial in diets (ARS, 2010). Neither 
of the two treatments showed a significant positive impact on fiber or protein content. In fact, the 
inclusive tax treatment actually reduced protein by 6 grams compared to the control group, and 
the exclusive tax treatment reduced fiber by 1 gram, and both of which were statistically 
significant. There has been research indicating that low protein diets will cause overeating 
(Gosby et al. 2011), and an increased intake of dietary fiber would be useful for the treatment of 
obesity (Smith, 1987). Hence, one perverse result in both tax policies is the reduction in the 
content of such beneficial nutrients.  
The separate estimation results from the DID model for the three main food categories are 
presented in Table 4. In the beverage category, calories, carbohydrates and added sugar changed 
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significantly in the inclusive tax treatment, but not in the exclusive tax treatment, which was 
consistent with the results in Table 3. Calorie content was reduced by 60.7% for beverages. What 
is worth noting is that the inclusive tax treatment also had a significant negative impact of 9 
grams (32.9%) on empty calorie content this time, while the exclusive tax treatment still had no 
impact on it. That is, an inclusive tax treatment was more effective in reducing the intake of food 
with little nutritional value than was the exclusive tax. 
When considering only the entrée category, calorie content significantly decreased by 122 
kcal (25.3%) in the inclusive tax treatment. Nutritional factors that changed significantly were 
cholesterol and protein in the inclusive tax treatment, with cholesterol content decreasing 29 
milligrams (42.8%), and protein content decreasing by 7 grams (27.2%) compared to the control 
group. The direction of the estimated treatment effect on protein was still opposite from the 
desired direction. 
If we consider the snack category only, none of the nutritional factors changed significantly 
in either treatment. The result is not surprising since it is consistent with our finding from Table 
2. 
Neither the inclusive tax nor the exclusive tax treatment had a significant impact on the 
contents of calories from fat, fiber, fat and sodium in any of the food categories. None of the 
nutritional factors changed significantly in any of the food categories in the exclusive tax 
treatment. 
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Table 5 presents the estimation results considering the entire menu, and using a DID model 
that compares the two treatments with each other without the control group. Table 5 helps us to 
determine if the impacts in the inclusive tax treatment and in the exclusive tax treatment are 
significantly different. The change in calorie content was not significantly different between the 
two treatments. However, this time empty calorie intake in the inclusive tax treatment changed 
significantly compared to the exclusive tax treatment, with 52 fewer empty calories (49.9%)4 
consumed in the inclusive tax treatment than in the exclusive tax treatment. Fat and cholesterol 
content changed significantly in inclusive tax treatment, with fat content reduced by 6 grams 
(26.2%) and cholesterol content reduced by 22 milligrams (36%). Researchers have concluded 
that a reduction in fat intake reduces the gap between total energy intake and total energy 
expenditure and thus would help reduce obesity (Bray and Popkin, 1998). Others have shown 
that the greater body weight the higher was the rate of cholesterol synthesis (Miettinen, 1971). 
Hence, the significant reduction in empty calorie, fat and cholesterol reinforces our conclusion 
that an inclusive tax had a substantially stronger impact than an exclusive tax on reducing the 
content of undesirable nutritional factors.  
Discussion 
We examined the impact of two types of taxes: an unhealthy food excise (inclusive) tax and 
a sales (exclusive) tax. Generally speaking, the inclusive tax had a stronger impact on the 
																																																								
4	 Percentage	changed	here	is	estimated	by	the	comparison	to	the	second	menu	selection	of	the	exclusive	tax	treatment.	
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nutritional content of the meal: the inclusive tax, which the subjects experienced as a 20% 
unhealthy food excise tax, led to the reduction of some undesirable nutritional factors such as 
calories, calories from fat, carbohydrates, cholesterol, added sugar and sodium. On the other 
hand, the exclusive tax, which the subjects experienced as a 20% unhealthy food sales tax, only 
led to a significant reduction of carbohydrates. The reason for this can be explained by the 
theoretical model: people lack the knowledge of tax status, and they tend to under-react to a tax 
that was not reflected in the shelf price for two reasons. First, because the items that were taxed 
were not specified on the menu, people in the exclusive tax treatment were less clear about the 
exact tax status of each item than people in the inclusive tax treatment, although the name of the 
tax (i.e., “unhealthy food tax”) was presented at the top of the menu. Second, even for items that 
people were certain about the tax status, they underestimated the after-tax price due to the 
complexity of calculating the amount of the tax.  
While both treatments had a negative impact on at least some undesirable nutritional factors, 
there were also unintended consequences of the taxes.  Most notably, both tax treatments had 
negative impacts on the contents of beneficial nutrients such as protein and fiber, and some of 
these impacts were statistically significant. One possible explanation is that for some subjects, 
the tax treatments nudged them into eating less, so instead of switching from an unhealthy item 
to a healthy one, they actually purchased fewer items in response to the tax. Additionally, the 
more uncertain subjects were about the tax, the fewer items they would purchase (Table 1). 
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Therefore, the consumption of beneficial nutrients such as fiber and protein decreased as the 
number of items ordered decreased.  
If we investigate the impacts by food categories, the impact of the inclusive tax was still 
stronger than the exclusive tax in each category. This treatment had the strongest impact on 
beverage items, with more nutrients affected in this category than in any of the others, while the 
nutritional composition of the snack category was barely affected by either of the treatments. In 
addition, although both treatments positively affected the fiber content in the entrée category, 
neither of these effects was significant – the effect of the taxes on beneficial nutrients was still 
perverse in all food categories.  
By comparing the change in selected nutritional factors in the inclusive tax treatment with 
that in the exclusive tax treatment, we examined if the impacts of these two policies were 
significantly different. While the inclusive tax had a negative impact on most of the undesirable 
nutritional factors compared to the exclusive tax, the nutrients that changed significantly between 
the treatments were quite different from those between the treatments and the control group. The 
DID model comparing the two treatments yielded different results for factors such as empty 
calories and fat. The inclusive tax treatment had a significantly stronger impact in reducing 
empty calories, fat and cholesterol than the exclusive tax treatment. However, the change in 
calories was not significantly different between the treatments. A tax-inclusive price being more 
informative could be one possible reason. As people were more familiar with calories than with 
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most of the specific nutrients, subjects would avoid high-calorie items in both treatments, so the 
change in calorie content was not significantly different. Since the inclusive tax better informed 
people which item was indeed unhealthy, it helped in reducing the content of empty calories, 
cholesterol and other undesirable nutrients that people were less familiar with.  
VI. Conclusions 
This research focused on the impact of two types of taxes on consumers’ purchasing 
behavior. In order to identify the more effective policy for reducing obesity, we empirically 
examined the impact of an inclusive tax and an exclusive tax on consumption patterns by 
conducting a laboratory experiment. Based on our estimation results, both inclusive and 
exclusive tax had negative impacts on the consumption of undesirable nutritional factors such as 
cholesterol and added sugar, but the inclusive tax was much more effective than the exclusive tax. 
This effect was robust to the entire menu, the beverage category and the entrée category. By 
comparing the change in nutrient content for the two treatments, the results indicated that the 
effect of the inclusive tax was significantly stronger than exclusive tax. However, both taxes had 
the unintended consequence of also reducing the consumption of some beneficial nutrients 
including fiber and protein, which might compromise the dietary balance.  
To obtain a better understanding of how the policies changed the nutritional composition by 
food categories, we examined the change of nutrient content within each category and found that 
in the inclusive tax treatment, compared to items selected in the other two categories, the 
	 24
nutritional composition of selected beverages changed more significantly. This result provides 
support for the efficacy of soft drink tax policies that have been implemented in 33 states in the 
United States. 
Our study contributes to the existing literature by providing empirical evidence to support 
theoretical models of how tax salience affects healthy eating. One major result of our study is 
that an inclusive tax policy has a significantly stronger effect than an exclusive tax. This finding 
provides an important policy implication for framing the unhealthy food tax policy to reduce 
obesity. That is, an excise tax works not only in encouraging people to eat healthier, but more 
importantly guiding people to eat a less unhealthy meal that includes undesirable nutritional 
factors.  
One important caveat of this study is it was conducted in a laboratory setting, which may 
not correspond to behavior in the real world for several reasons. First, in the experiment, the rate 
of unhealthy food tax was presented to the subjects both orally and in written form, while in 
reality, people are less clear about the exact tax rate. Second, in a laboratory setting, participants 
are aware that their decision will be thoroughly investigated, which is not true in the real world. 
Third, the measured effect is a one-shot only effect, and it may not persist over time. Thus our 
results should be viewed as an upper bound for the actual effect of various tax policies and serve 
as an indication of the relative effects of the proposed measures (Levitt and List, 2007). 
Consequently, the results generated from our laboratory experiment should be generalized with 
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caution.  
Despite the effect of limitations, the caloric intake and nutrient intake of this lab study 
provide the first comparison of excise taxes and sales taxes. Further research is needed to study 
the long-term effects and examine the change in nutritional quality across all meals in a day. 
Overall, to our knowledge, this is the first study that involves empirical evidence to suggest a 
well-designed unhealthy food excise tax policy might be more effective than an unhealthy food 
sales tax policy in reducing obesity. 
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Table	1.	Descriptive	Statistics	of	Selected	Variables	by	Treatment5	
Treatment
 All Control Inclusive tax Exclusive tax 
Female 0.817(0.388)
0.825
(0.385)
0.875 
(0.334) 
0.744
(0.441)
Age 
Less than 20 0.176(0.382)
0.1
(0.304)
0.208 
(0.410) 
0.209
(0.412)
21-30 0.221(0.417)
0.225
(0.423)
0.146 
(0.357) 
0.302
(0.465)
31-40 0.344(0.477)
0.375
(0.490)
0.333 
(0.476) 
0.326
(0.474)
41-50 0.252(0.436)
0.3
(0.464)
0.292 
(0.459) 
0.163
(0.374)
over 50 0.374(0.486)
0.325
(0.474
0.313 
(0.468) 
0.488
(0.506)
Married 0.481(0.502)
0.25
(0.439)
0.521 
(0.505) 
0.419
(0.499)
Children 1.122(1.110)
1.15
(1.099)
1.167 
(1.038) 
1.047
(1.214)
Race 
Caucasian 0.870(0.498)
0.911
(0.158)
0.854 
(0.144) 
0.844
(0.213)
African American 0.031(0.436)
0.022
(0.267)
0.024 
(0.202) 
0.044
(0.213)
Asian 0.069(0.254)
0.067
(0.152)
0.049 
(0.144) 
0.044
(0)
Hispanic 0.008(0.150)
0
(0)
0.024 
(0.213) 
0 
(0)
Smoke 0.008(0.087)
0
(0)
0.021 
(0.144) 
0 
(0)
Vegetarian or vegan 0.061(0.240)
0.1
(0.303)
0.063 
(0.245) 
0.023
(0.152)
Alcohol 0.061(0.240)
0.075
(0.267)
0.104 
(0.309) 
0 
(0)
Income level 
Less than 
$40,000 
0.435
(0.498)
0.45
(0.503)
0.395 
(0.494) 
0.465
(0.505)
$40,001-$80,000 0.252(0.436)
0.25
(0.439)
0.271 
(0.449) 
0.233
(0.427)
$80,001-$120,000 0.069(0.254)
0.1
(0.304)
0.021 
(0.144) 
0.093
(0.294)
Education 
Only high school 0.191(0.394)
0.15
(0.362)
0.208 
(0.410) 
0.209
(0.412)
Undergraduate 
degree 
0.282
(0.452)
0.3
(0.494)
0.271 
(0.449) 
0.279
(0.454)
Graduate degree 0.053(0.226)
0.075
(0.267)
0.042 
(0.202) 
0.047
(0.213)
Change in caloric consumption 
-66.557
(272.22
2)
-5.275
(379.282) 
-109.896 
(192.952) 
-75.186
(233.656) 
Change in # of items ordered from
menu 1 to menu 2 
-0.038
(0.635)
0.341
(0.693)
-0.042 
(0.504) 
-0.163
(0.615)
# of subjects 131 40 48 43
	
																																																								
5	 Means	are	shown	and	standard	deviations	are	below	in	parenthesis.	 	
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Table	2.	Summary	of	change	in	food	selection	from	Menu	1	to	Menu	2	
	
Eating pattern 
Change in 
unhealthy 
level1 
Number of Subjects 
Whole Menu Beverage Entrée Snack 
C   I E T C I E T C I E T C I E T2 
Less unhealthy3 
<-2 5  7 4 16  2  2 2  1 3  1  1 
-2 8 7 3 18 1 3 1 5 8 1 4 13 3 3 2 8 
-1 8 6 5 19 5 4 1 10 4 10 3 17 11 7 8 26 
Neutral4 0 8 24 26 58 31 29 40 100 12 36 33 81 19 31 27 77 
Unhealthier5 
1 3 2 3 8 2 9  11 7 1  8 6 6 6 18 
2 5 1 2 8 1 1 1 3 5  2 7 1   1 
>2 3 1  4     2   2     
% of change 80% 50% 40% 56% 22% 40% 7% 24% 70% 25%  23% 38% 52% 35% 37% 41% 
     -  To less unhealthy 66% 83% 71% 73% 67% 47% 67% 55% 50% 92% 80% 66% 67% 65% 63% 65% 
     -  To unhealthier 34% 17% 29% 27% 33% 53% 33% 45% 50% 8% 20% 34% 33% 35% 37% 35% 
Total # of subjects 40 48 43 131 40 48 43 131 40 48 43 131 40 48 43 131 
1 Change in unhealthy level is calculated as follow: (# of unhealthy items in menu 2- # of healthy items in menu 2) -  (# of unhealthy items 
in menu 1- # of healthy items in menu 1) 
2 C: Control group. E: Exclusive treatment. I: Inclusive treatment. T: Total. 
3 The difference between unhealthy items and healthy items selected is decreased from menu 1 to menu 2. The eating habit is assigned “Less 
unhealthy”. 
4 The difference between unhealthy items and healthy items selected in menu 1 equals to that in menu 2. The eating habit is assigned 
“Neutral”.. 
5 The difference between unhealthy items and healthy items selected is increased from menu 1 to menu 2. The eating habit is assigned 
“Unhealthier”. 
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Table	3.	Estimation	results	from	DID	model	based	on	the	entire	menu;	comparing	each	treatment	
with	the	control	group	
	
	 	 	 Variable	
	 Calories	 Empty	Calories	 Calorie	from	fat	 Carbohydrate	 Fiber	
Inclusive	tax	
treatment	
‐155.893***	
(57.846)	
‐12.055	
(21.203)	
‐29.031*	
(17.972)	
‐20.822***	
(6.365)	
‐0.144	
(0.524)	
Exclusive	tax	
treatment	
‐69.693	
(60.430)	
24.478	
(22.150)	
2.300	
(18.775)	
‐15.728**	
(6.649)	
‐1.078*	
(0.548)	
	
	 Fat	 Cholesterol	 Protein	 Added	Sugar	 Sodium	
Inclusive	tax	
treatment	
‐5.528	
(3.654)	
‐25.445**	
(11.292)	
‐6.447**	
(3.217)	
‐12.831***	
(4.891)	
‐249.167*	
(147.853)	
Exclusive	tax	
treatment	
0.347	
(3.818)	
‐1.573	
(11.797)	
‐1.877	
(3.361)	
‐6.047	
(5.110)	
66.687	
(154.458)	
#	of	
Observations	
131	
Socio‐economic	
dummies	 gender,	age,	race,	marital	status,	children,	income	level,	educational	level	
Other	dummies	 alcohol	and	smoking	habits,	vegan	or	vegetarian,	self‐assessed	weight	status,	preferences	
over	organic	food	
Standard	errors	in	parentheses	
***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1	
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Table	 4.	 Estimation	 results	 from	 DID	model	 for	 the	 three	main	 food	 categories;	 comparing	 each	
treatment	with	the	control	group	
	
Beverage	Only	
	 Calories	 Empty	Calories	 Calorie	from	fat	 Carbohydrate	 Fiber6	
Inclusive	tax	
treatment	
‐28.771*	
(16.424)	
‐31.962*	
(16.626)	
0.818	
(3.481)	
‐7.827**	
(3.834)	
‐	
Exclusive	tax	
treatment	
‐19.173	
(17.158)	
‐17.144	
(17.369)	
‐3.957	
(3.636)	
‐3.314	
(4.006)	
‐	
	
	 Fat	 Cholesterol	 Protein	 Added	Sugar	 Sodium	
Inclusive	tax	
treatment	
0.076	
(0.374)	
0.360	
(1.031)	
0.255	
(0.728)	
‐9.222**	
(3.874)	
‐2.741	
(9.914)	
Exclusive	tax	
treatment	
‐0.369	
(0.390)	
‐1.196	
(1.077)	
‐0.611	
(0.761)	
‐0.677	
(4.047)	
‐13.195	
(10.357)	
	 	
	
	
Entrée	Only	
	 Calories	 Empty	Calories	 Calorie	from	fat	 Carbohydrate	 Fiber	
Inclusive	tax	
treatment	
‐122.564*	
(77.166)	
‐1.854	
(18.629)	
‐22.484	
(17.680)	
‐7.478	
(5.464)	
0.295	
(0.389)	
Exclusive	tax	
treatment	
9.822	
(80.613)	
16.611	
(19.461)	
7.662	
(18.469)	
‐0.792	
(5.708)	
0.073	
(0.407)	
	
	 Fat	 Cholesterol	 Protein	 Added	Sugar	 Sodium	
Inclusive	tax	
treatment	
‐6.657	
(4.833)	
‐29.418**	
(14.598)	
‐7.280*	
(4.221)	
‐1.757	
(1.114)	
‐303.985	
(200.749)	
Exclusive	tax	
treatment	
1.468	
(5.048)	
2.884	
(15.250)	
0.506	
(4.410)	
0.256	
(1.164)	
137.658	
(209.716)	
Standard	errors	in	parentheses	
***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1	
	
	 	
																																																								
6	 Multicollinearity	occurs	when	estimating	the	treatment	effects	on	fiber,	due	to	the	low	or	zero	fiber	content	of	beverage	
items.	 	
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Table	4	(continued)	
	
Snack	Only	
	 Calories	 Empty	Calories	 Calorie	from	fat	 Carbohydrate	 Fiber	
Inclusive	tax	
treatment	
‐4.610	
(30.400)	
4.784	
(6.970)	
1.627	
(2.910)	
1.138	
(4.554)	
‐0.252	
(0.390)	
Exclusive	tax	
treatment	
‐23.207	
(31.768)	
0.263	
(7.281)	
‐0.300	
(3.040)	
‐3.300	
(4.757)	
‐0.584	
(0.407)	
	
	 Fat	 Cholesterol	 Protein	 Added	Sugar	 Sodium	
Inclusive	tax	
treatment	
‐0.648	
(1.333)	
2.765	
(2.399)	
‐0.121	
(0.388)	
‐1.100	
(2.745)	
‐13.229	
(24.740)	
Exclusive	tax	
treatment	
‐0.757	
(1.392)	
0.293	
(2.506)	
‐0.245	
(0.406)	
‐2.611	
(2.868)	
‐17.400	
(25.845)	
Standard	errors	in	parentheses	
***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1	
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Table	5.	Estimation	results	from	DID	model	based	on	the	entire	menu;	comparing	the	inclusive	tax	
treatment	with	exclusive	tax	treatment	
	
	 	 	 Variable	
	 Calories	 Empty	Calories	 Calorie	from	fat	 Carbohydrate	 Fiber	
Inclusive	tax	
treatment	
‐50.329	
(47.579)	
‐51.611**	
(21.820)	
‐30.187	
(18.935)	
3.931	
(6.409)	
‐0.145	
(0.486)	
	
	 Fat	 Cholesterol	 Protein	 Added	Sugar	 Sodium	
Inclusive	tax	
treatment	
‐5.680**	
(2.830)	
‐21.534**	
(9.686)	
‐3.275	
(2.730)	
‐4.781	
(4.842)	
‐137.584	
(122.615)	
#	of	
Observations	
91	
Socio‐economic	
dummies	 gender,	age,	race,	marital	status,	children,	income	level,	educational	level	
Other	dummies	 alcohol	and	smoking	habits,	vegan	or	vegetarian,	self‐assessed	weight	status,	preferences	
over	organic	food	
Standard	errors	in	parentheses	
***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1	
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Appendix	
	
A1.	Items	and	respective	prices	in	control	and	treatments	
Items	 Price	
(1)	 (2)	
Diet	Pepsi	(20	oz.)	 $1.85		 $1.85		
 Pepsi	(20	oz.)	 $1.85		 $2.22		
 Gatorade	Low	Calorie	 $2.15		 $2.15		
 Mountain	Dew	(20	oz.)	 $1.85		 $2.22		
 Unsweetened	Iced	Tea	LIPTON	 $2.15		 $2.15		
 Original	Iced	Tea	LIPTON	 $2.15		 $2.58		
 Tropicana	Lemonade	 $1.85		 $2.22		
 Propel	Zero	 $2.25		 $2.25		
 Grabba	Whole	Milk	 $1.49		 $1.79		
 Grabba	Fat	Free	Milk	 $1.49		 $1.49		
 Ocean	Spray	Juice	Drink	 $2.15		 $2.58		
 Bottled	Water	 $1.95		 $1.95		
 Green	Salad		 (Sesame	or	Balsamic	Dressing)	 $7.49		 $7.49		
 Green	Salad	with	Tuna	(Sesame	or	Balsamic	Dressing)	 $7.49		 $7.49		
 3	Chicken	Fingers	 $5.69		 $6.83		
 Cheese	Pizza	(personal	pan	6")	 $4.25		 $5.10		
 Pepperoni	Pizza	(personal	pan	6")	 $4.75		 $5.70		
 Bacon	Cheeseburger	 $6.27		 $7.07		
 Turkey	Burger	 $4.49		 $4.49		
 Garden	Burger	 $4.49		 $4.49		
 French	Fries	 $1.99		 $2.39		
 Tuna	Salad	Sandwich	 $4.99		 $4.99		
 Chicken	or	Steak	Fajita	Quesadilla	 $6.79		 $8.15		
 Lo‐Mien	Noodle	Bowl	with	Chicken	 $4.99		 $4.99		
 Veggie	Cup	 $2.99		 $2.99		
 Seaweed	Salad	 $4.99		 $4.99		
 Tempura	Vegetable	Roll	 $6.49		 $6.49		
 SunChips	(small	bag)	 $1.09		 $1.31		
 Fresh	Apple	 $1.00		 $1.00		
 Fresh	Banana	 $1.00		 $1.00		
 Fresh	Orange	 $1.00		 $1.00		
 5	Pack	Cookies	 $1.89		 $2.27		
 Brownie	 $1.59		 $1.99		
	
(1) Posted	 and	 total	 price	 for	 items	 on	 menu	 1	 and	menu	 2	 of	 control,	 and	 menu	 1	 of	 exclusive	 tax	 treatment	 and	
inclusive	tax	treatment.	Posted	price	for	items	on	menu	2	of	exclusive	tax	treatment	
(2) Posted	and	total	price	for	items	on	menu	2	of	inclusive	tax	treatment.	Total	price	for	items	on	menu	2	of	exclusive	tax	
treatment.	
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A2.	Socio‐demographic	questions	and	answer	option	list
#	 Question	 Answer	Options/Description	
1	 What	is	your	gender?	 Drop‐down	list:
- male	
- female	
2	 What	is	your	age?	 Drop‐down	list:
- 20	or	less	 	
- 21‐30	
- 31‐40	
- 41‐50	
- 51	or	more	
3	 What	 is	 the	 highest	 level	 of	 education	 you	 have	
achieved?	
Drop‐down	list:
- High	School	
- Undergraduate	degree	 	
- Associate	degree	
- Graduate	degree	or	higher	
4	 How	would	you	describe	yourself? Drop‐down	list:
- Caucasian	
- African	American	
- Asian/Asian	American	
- Hispanic	
- Native	American	
- Other	
5	 What	is	your	family	household	income	level?	 Drop‐down	list:
- Less	than	$40,000	
- $40,001‐$80,000	
- $80,001‐$120,000	
- $120,001‐$160,000	
- Over	160,000	
- Decline	to	answer	
6	 What	is	your	marital	status?	 Drop‐down	list:
- single	
- married	
- divorce	
7	 How	many	children	do	you	have?	 Drop‐down	list:
- no	
- one	
- two	
- three	
- four	
- more	than	four	
8	 Do	you	smoke?	 Drop‐down	list:
- yes	
- no	
9	 Are	you	a	vegetarian	or	a	vegan?	 Drop‐down	list:	
- yes	
- no	
10	 Do	you	drink	alcoholic	beverages? Drop‐down	list:
- yes	
- no	
11	 How	would	you	describe	your	health	condition? Drop‐down	list:
- underweight	
- normal	weight	
- slightly	overweight	
- overweight	
- obese	
12	 Do	you	often	buy	organic	products? Drop‐down	list:
- yes	
- no	

